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«You Europeans, you are just like
Fish!». Some sceptical relfections on




"You Europeans, you are just like Fish!” Anonymous Kaonde woman quoted in K. Crehan, 
The Fractured Community landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1997 p. 87.
1 African nationalism  comprised  two  elements.  One,  largely  negative,  identified  two
enemies. The first was colonialism itself but this could be attacked using the very notions
that Westernisation had already provided.  The second was African traditions broadly
conceived. As Nkrumah put it in 1961 the people had to be liberated «from the bondage of
foreign colonial rule and the tyranny of local feudalism»1. Even if many African leaders shied
away from such blunt statements, seeking solace perhaps in the alternatives, whether
Pan-Africanism or various symbolic reassertions of tradition, they did not substantially
disagree. The pretty texts of African history and civilisation and the rhetoric of Pan-
Africanism were  the  gilding  not  the  substance.  At  best  they  buttressed  some  shaky
mechanisms  of  psychological  reassurance  and  provided  for  the  reassertion  of  racial
dignity. They certainly never provided any means of seriously thinking about politics.
Beyond identification of the enemy African nationalism comprised deep resentment of
«backwardness», understood largely in terms of wealth and power, allied with an equally
strong conviction that  the way to overcome that  backwardness  was to emu late  the
Western state as closely as possible, with all its attendant representational, bureaucratic
and juridical modes insofar as these expedited modernisation. African nationalism was
«You Europeans, you are just like Fish!». Some sceptical relfections on Moder...
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 3 | 2002
1
about  the  securing  of  power  in  already  demarcated  territories,  the  control  and
consolidation  of  already  existing  states  and  the  (if  necessary)  ruthless  subjection  of
heterogeneous societies to the processes of modernisation.
 
The Promise of Modernisation
2 Thus the first generation of African leaders variously saw their task «to combat prejudices,
routine,  inferiority  complexes  and  the  fatalistic  spirit»;  to  place  themselves  in  step  with
«evolutionary laws»; to emancipate the «spiritually and mentally bewitched»; to «goad [their
societies] into the acceptance of the stimuli necessary to rapid economic development»; to «create
a new mentality and way of seeing things»2. However startling these texts may seem now they
shared  a  common  commitment  to  extremely  ambitious  programmes  of  social
transformation,  in  which  modernity  is  exemplified  by  science,  progress,  discipline,
themselves all embodied in the form of the modern state. There are often (rather vague)
acknowledgements  of  the  need to  adjust this  to  local  realities,  an  acknowledgement
which,  sometimes,  shades  into  some  realism  about  the  obstacles  confronting  a
modernising  project  in  Africa,  and  even,  occasionally,  some  ambivalence  about  the
relationship between Africa and modernity. But, despite this cautious note, what stands
out is an almost magical wishing into being of modernity, a tendency which, to be fair,
was by no means restricted to African elites but extended to their (then) friends in the
West. Africanist scholarship was formally constituted as a legitimate endeavour within
the academic division of labour during a period in which modernisation was the ruling
idea.  And if  the  state  was  the  vehicle  then nationalism (benign,  curiously,  in  Africa
malevolent  everywhere  else)  was  the  fuel  of  modernisation.  The  newly  independent
African countries were to be transformed into modern, dynamic societies in which the
combined forces of economic growth, urbanisation, education and the mass media would
sustain new forms of associational life and create informed, participant citizens with both
of these providing the essential props, at least eventually, of a liberal democratic political
order. 
3 The centrality  of  modernisation,  the  state  and nationalism ensured that  history  and
political  science became prominent,  indeed predominant,  in the new African Studies,
anthropology having become increasingly suspect as the handmaiden of colonialism or
worse, as the purveyor of a patronising account of Africans, implying they were incapable
of modernity. The new disciplines by contrast were heavily complicit in the modernising
project, uncovering glorious historical pasts for modern African nation-states, praising
African nationalism and its continuities with the pre colonial «struggles for freedom»,
and vaunting the new political organisations that would lead African countries to the
New Era. In sum these efforts were as much to do with ideological and political agendas in




4 This particular bundle of concepts and understandings now seems a world away. The
modernising project in all its variants has signally failed in Africa to effect the anticipated
transformations.  More than this the whole framework of categories clustered around
«You Europeans, you are just like Fish!». Some sceptical relfections on Moder...
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 3 | 2002
2
modernisation,  indeed the very idea of a transition from «tradition» to «modernity»,
appeared  confounded  by  what  was  happening  in  independent  Africa.  Perhaps  most
poignantly  «tribalism»  or  «ethnicity»,  far  from  dissolving  in  the  face  of  progress,
appeared to acquire increased virulence; indeed as African nationalism evaporated, to
become  the  main  currency  of  the  new  state  politics,  often  in  urban  locations  once
thought to be the very engine rooms of modernity.  It  no longer seemed plausible to
regard  ethnicity  as  a  cultural  hangover  or  even  a  temporary  compass  in  a  rapidly
modernising  environment,  but  rather  it  appeared  to  be  a  veritable  product  of
modernisation itself,  driven by increasingly  bitter struggles  for  power and resources
within the structures of the new states. The results of empirical enquiry were supported
by theoretical interrogation and critique. This suggested that «tradition» came to be a
sort of residual category that meant little more than the not-modern; the effect of that
being that no real differences in traditions could be registered and the only change that
this terminology could recognise was transition towards the Western experience; and
finally  that  tradition and modernity  represented mutually  exclusive and functionally
interdependent clusters of attributes so that urbanisation was naturally bundled with
capitalism, democracy, secularisation and so on, an assumption that precluded various
forms  of  mixture  of  the  traditional  and  the  modern.  Beyond  these  descriptive  and
analytical points the categories of tradition and modernity came under fire on normative
grounds. This was part of a much larger shift of Western sensibilities, particularly but by
no means exclusively exemplified in academic discourse,  which came to consider the
attribution  to  «Others»  (or,  more  portentously,  the  «Other»)  of  such  notions  as
«tradition» as not only empirically and conceptually empty, but both morally offensive
and complicit in, if not directly constitutive of, oppressive forms of social and political
relations.
5 Such criticisms generated of course their own dilemmas well captured by Feierman - «If
we define the people of a given society as different from us, then we have defined them as other,
distant from us, not subject to the same historical forces or living in the same moral universe. This
is unacceptable. But if we say that we are indeed coeval, living in the same era, subject to the same
historical forces, struggling with the same issues,  then we lose the picture of cultural variation
which is the heart of anthropology»3.  Attempts to resolve this difficulty have prompted, not
only  across  the  social  sciences  and humanities  but  in  certain areas  of  policy  debate
especially about «development», wide spread assertions of «agency» on behalf of social
actors and insistent calls for (anti) «essentialism». The first connotes a repudiation of
«victimhood» and a robust assertion of the social and cognitive capabilities of ordinary
individuals. Anti-essentialism questions both the idea that identities are naturally given
and  that  people  can  have  integral  and  unproblematic  identities.  By  extension  such
arguments «challenge accounts of collective identities as based on some 'essence' or set of core
features shared by all members of the collectivity and no others»4.  So in the field of African
studies more generally such arguments have provided some of the intellectual resources
to proclaim a new world of «creolisation» and «glocalisation»5. The old myth of a Merrie
Africa of  cultural  authenticity  and /  or  «backwardness» gives  way to a  post-modern
Africa  of  endlessly  ecstatic  bricolage  and  multiple  modernities6. Not  the  least  of  the
benefits of such a view (at least for its proponents) is that the «historicity» of African
societies is  restored and by (very strong) implication the standing of Africans as full
members of (one) human family is re-asserted. 
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6 All of these shifts finally have had their impact on understandings of African politics. Old
paradigms  could  now  be  dismissed  as  «mere  ideological  preconceptions»  which  have
«abysmally failed the test of plausibility»7.  «Dependency is a fairy tale» and development is a
«disastrous notion»8. Modernisation theory can see only a failed state to be explained by
«tradition»,  its  explanatory  framework allowing only  a  vacuous  teleology or  a  facile
exoticism. Dependency theory is  no better,  seeing African realities only as externally
determined by global class forces. Both are «analytic disasters»9. But beyond such polemics
several positions are posed. Firstly, it is argued that African politics should be understood
by  means  of  universal  concepts,  not  treated,  as  Stephen  Ellis  puts  it,  in  terms  of
«otherness»10. Secondly, it is suggested that political analysis is now informed by a great
deal more knowledge and particularly historical knowledge. The frequent and passionate
assertions of «historicity» register a claim to Africa being a part of history, as having a
capacity to be understood in its own terms and not as a function of something else (say
Western imperialism). This requires the «de-exoticisation» and its re-understanding as a
practice simultaneously asserting the capacity for action amongst subordinate as well as
ruling groups. As a result it becomes possible to emphasise the continuities in African
political  life.  Thirdly,  and most  importantly,  it  has  led to  the view that  the modern
African state is precisely that, a modern African state; it has, been grafted onto African
societies. It is to its foundations and the associated political strategies that we should
attend rather than such irrelevancies as the form of state or the ideological statements of
leaders and so on.
 
The Return of Modernisation
7 There is no doubt that this onslaught has had effects, bringing about dramatic changes in
words  and usages.  No-one  now dare  talk  of  imparting «civilisation»  or  «making  men
modern»11. In  academic  and  policy  circles  alike  slogans  abound  calling  for  «African
solutions»  or  «African  alternatives».  These  shifts  are  not  mere  changes  of  tone  or
rhetoric,  yet  another  threadbare  mask  to  cover  the  ever  sinister  play  of  Western
interests. But their importance need not obscure the fact that, concurrent with them, the
modernisation framework (and its dependency cousin), far from disappearing, has rather
shifted its ground. The key to this remains the state. It was the state that was to open the
door to progress and it is the state that is now seen to have failed. Although there are
considerable differences in theoretical provenance and language a duster of themes has
emerged to constitute the new mainstream understanding. African states lack legitimacy
because there is no real political representation or participation. To the extent that states
are linked to the wider society it  is  through forms of  clientelist  politics.  Clientelism
breeds corruption and arbitrariness and the scope for all these is greatly increased by a
large degree of state intervention in the economy. The form of politics that results is a
ruthless struggle for power and resources by individuals and cliques and leads to the
state's development policy being made against the interests of society as a whole. Over
time African societies, or elements of them, have resisted these tendencies causing both
politics and states to fail. And so debate has shifted to firstly, how to make the state work
better  and  secondly,  how  to  achieve  by  other  means  things  that  should  have  been
achieved by the state.  Simplifying somewhat,  both of  these are seen to point  in the
direction of the market and civil society because the former removes opportunities for
rent-seeking and corruption and because accountability  comes from the existence of
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independent power bases in society. Thus both together will constrain the possibilities of
the abuse of office by state officials and both will  make possible the emergence of a
properly constituted public authority properly committed to the public interest. 
8 Not surprisingly then on this shifted terrain the (new look) modernisation school suggest
that things really are changing this time (or at  least  have the potential  to do so)  as
vibrant civil societies and democratisation bring corrupt and tyrannical regimes to heel.
Voluntary associations or non-governmental organisations have come to be seen as the
key to strengthening African civil society. It is true that within this context much more
attention is paid to «the indigenous » (and this is a particular fancy of Western NGOs) but
this  is  to  the  degree  that  the  indigenous  suits  or  is  conducive  to  the  processes  of
modernisation. This emphasis on the indigenous also suits a kind of policy discourse as it
suggests that while it is appropriate for «the international community» to intervene in the
affairs of African states this is in order to assist the (good) domestic forces agitating for
change against the (bad) old elites and preserves at least a (very threadbare) notion of
sovereignty.
9 If modernisation theory has been reworked rather than buried it is not unlikely that some
form of  dependency  theory  continues  to  survive;  and  so  it  proves.  This  (new look)
dependency school no longer places the same emphasis on structural economic variables
(terms of trade, capital flows and the like) but rather on political strategies. But against
the mainstream positions it suggests that, what it often calls a neo-liberal agenda does
not  promise  a  genuine modernisation because  it  is  constructed to  sanction only  the
enhancement of technocratic control over African societies within a globalising capitalist
order. Despite a fig-leaf of commitment to democracy and empowerment the policies of
structural adjustment have done great damage to those groups in African societies in the
forefront of struggles for democracy, groups who are, in addition, often most vociferously
opposed to structural adjustment and related policies12. It follows that what is really
needed in Africa is  a genuine civil  society and real  democratisation involving popular
participation as  the  means to  a  rekindling of  the  nation-state  building strategy.  But
ultimately  in this  view the political  motivations  of  the masses  are  largely  driven by
economic welfare considerations; only once these are improved can their commitment to
democracy be secured, essentially by outside forces.
10 The most notable feature of this reconfiguration of modernisation theory involves a shift
in some time-honoured assumptions about democracy. The effective operation of this
form of  political  order  was  long  argued  to  involve  certain  structural  pre-requisites,
including a certain level of economic prosperity, a large middle-class, fairly high levels of
education for the mass population and so on. Now the presumed causalities are reversed
so that the lack of democracy (or at least an accountable state) becomes the root cause of
the lack of development. While acknowledging this shift it is important to note that, in
both its «mainstream» and «radical» variants, it is not a politicisation of modernisation
theory  (the  political  was  always  central)  but  rather  a  shift,  from an  emphasis  on  a
modernising state to one on a modernising civil  society;  and that,  while it  may have
important implications for policy and certain kinds of empirical research, in no sense
does it part company with the dominant analytical and normative assumptions prevalent
in Western liberal social and political theory.
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A Liberal Project
11 These considerations suggest that both the sheer resilience and the analytical ambiguities
of  «modernisation  theory»  are  much more  deeply  rooted  within  Western  social  and
political theory than is generally acknowledged. For some of course it may be sufficient to
repeat the familiar criticisms of modernisation theory and leave it at that. For those not
content with such a manoeuvre a question remains as to whether the notions of tradition
and modernity are quite as bankrupt as they are now usually said to be. In approaching
that issue it is sensible to acknowledge that there is little doubt that these terms have
come to carry an insupportable weight subsuming transitions as varied as custom to law,
communal  to  private  property,  barter  to  exchange,  seasonal  to  clock  time,  craft  to
automated  production  and  so  on;  and  that  the  idea  that  all  these  continua
straightforwardly join in two contrasting bundles is the «error of seeing everything modern
as belonging to one Enlightenment package»13. 
12 But  at  their  most  intellectually  serious  the  various  conceptual  schemes  devised  by
European social theory were intended to distinguish forms of social order characterised
by the presumption of the universality and equality of individual interests conjoined with
a universal morality, all under the aegis of a universal reason; and forms of social order
that were not. Modern societies would take the form of a differentiation of spheres of
activity - the economic, the political, the familial, and so on to which different values and
orientations, could be deemed appropriate. The values appropriate to one sphere could
be positively dysfunctional in another. Various accounts provided more or less elaborate
pictures of this form of social order, especially the problems of ensuring its coherence,
but undergirding them all was a distinction between «private» and «public». The public
sphere, comprising both the state proper and the market in its formal constitution and
operation, embodied rationality and impersonality. As we have seen it is the failure of
African societies, and especially states, to respect (and police) this boundary that forms
the core of the contemporary mainstream explanation of African state and wider social
failure.
13 But these boundaries (notably between public and private) are not firm and there has
been and is always a tension between them14. The exact domains of the private and the
public  have always varied historically and can only be made sense of  as  part  of  the
attempt to construct a liberal capitalist order. Liberal authors often comfortingly suggest
that, «we know directly of communities without markets, bound by unspoken obligations in which
altruism and reciprocity appear to govern and in which cohesion is maintained without coercion.
These are our families»15. There is an important sense in which this is right not least in
acknowledging that such relationships certainly have existed, and perhaps still do, inside
the  heartlands  of  liberal  capitalism and require  no «oth ering »  or  «exoticising »  of
strange peoples. But such assertions are deeply misleading if they imply that private and
public comfortably co-exist. It may be true that over long historical periods the (nuclear)
family in various forms has been tolerated as an institution which more or less looks after
itself and remains an appropriate place for the practical business of child-rearing and
early moral socialisation. But this tolerance has been and is always under siege by more
hostile stances towards the family, either insinuating it is nothing more than an ersatz 
contract or denouncing it as «oppression», in whichever case insisting it is not what it
says it is. It is these understandings that inform past and current efforts to subject the
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family to the logic of contract and «rights» both within the boundaries of states, and
increasingly, across them16. The endless difficulties that liberal thought and practise have
had with the family gives the clue to their response to communities larger than families -
either they do not «really» exist at all (they are just illusions at best fantasies at worst
«oppressions»),  or  perhaps  more  generously,  culture  is  really  «epiphenomenal»  an
accompaniment  to  social  activities  whose  real  centre  of  gravity  lies  elsewhere;  or  if
communities and cul tures do exist, they may be of the «wrong» kind. The «enthusiasm for
writing out of human history every instance of authentic and autonomous 'Others'» is not, pace 
Professor Lee, an aberration of a few scholars, but a deep-seated constant of Western
discourse and practice17. 
14 Such  considerations  may  enable  us  to  identify  the  rational  kernel  of  modernisation
theory. What marks non-modernised communities and cultures is extensive interaction
on all dimensions of social life within the boundaries of those communities, the relative
impermeability of the boundaries, at least where that would threat en the integrity of the
group and the self-sufficiency of the culture's own moral and normative standards; that is
to say that the main source of moral and normative standards is from within the culture.
None of this precludes «borrowings» (and the empirical evidence for this is of course
undeniable) provided that these do not over whelm the boundaries of the culture (and of
course many cultures and communities have ceased to exist). What makes modernisation
different  is  that  it  means  the  dis  embedding  of  people  from  their  cultures  and
communities in the form of individual emancipation; it can therefore be understood as
«the  increase  of  individualism  and  indi viduality»18.  But  it  is  also  about  re-embedding
individuals in new forms of social groups which, even if they are not wholly reduced to
the impersonality of the state and the market, come to substantially depend on those
forms of social order.
15 Such considerations also throw some light  on the question of  the state.  The endless
ambiguities  about  the  state,  accountable  but  not  captured,  autonomous  but  not
oppressive, neutral but interventionist, are thus rooted in the deeper ambiguities of the
private I public distinction and can only be made sense of as a project. In this context the
liberal state must be both weak and strong. Weak because, on the one hand, the state is
purely an enabler, little more than a neutral mechanism providing the security to allow
free,  equal  individuals  to  pursue  their  life  projects,  unhindered  by  others.  In  this
understanding a strong state is a potential threat to free persons. Firstly, the state may
attempt  to  impose  some particular  social  order,  embodying some set  of  values,  that
constrains peoples' freedom and secondly, that the offices of the state may be abused by
their incumbents (and the stronger the state the greater the possible abuses). The way to
counter these threats is to institutionalise some form of accountability and historically, as
a general tendency, this has taken the form of firstly, of a universal legal code to which
state officials  are also subject, and secondly a  complex of  institutions now generally
referred to  as  liberal  democracy  and comprising  universal  suffrage,  political  parties,
rights of political participation and so on. 
16 But this is only half the story. The other half is a series of arguments that require that the
state be strong. This strong state must to a certain extent be disengaged from social
interests and certainly not be overwhelmed by them. It must be capable of imposing and
maintaining a certain kind of social order, essentially a liberal capitalist order. Far from
being merely accountable to social interests it must be capable of ensuring that only the
right kind of interests are in play; indeed in terms of the European experience it is not
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implausible to suggest that the state itself is commit ted to the constitution of social
classes as a new form of social order19. In this half of the story it is quite impossible for
the liberal state to be neutral and indifferent to values; rather it must actively interfere in
what people believe and how they live, even to the extent of inculcating certain kinds of
values and dispositions. Such elaborate processes of transformation of both «structures»
and «values» require not a minimalist state, but a state constituted in the form of an
immense bureaucratic apparatus with all the capacity for fine-grained social surveillance
and social control which that makes possible.
 
The Liberal Project in Africa
17 Constructing such a state and putting it to use is perhaps the greatest political drama of
modernity and difficult enough in its heartlands. Neither was likely to be any easier in
Africa  -  as  Cahen  puts  it,  counterposing  Third  Republic  France  with  contemporary
Mozambique, «things do not go anywhere near as smoothly in the capitalist periphery, where the
authoritarian  modernising  state  is  not  a  source  of  upward  mobility.  Its  policies  are  in  these
conditions a stick with no corresponding carrot. Its political identity is experienced as alien by its
peoples, who thus develop defensive, centrifugal, anti-state identi ties in response»20. It certainly
could be argued that African elites have not been as adept as they might have been. In
retrospect both the sheer fragility of African «nationalism » in the absence of the colonial
master, and the formidable difficulty, in the face of bewildering diversity, of providing it
with any cultural content, have become clear. Even its development content has been
excessively  aspirational,  often  quite  unrealistic,  and  more  often  than  not  seemingly
innocent of the processes and instruments of social change in the West (and indeed in the
East) the effects of which it sought to emulate21.Of these, the most important, yet again,
was the state. The mesmeric effect of the modern state on African elites had never been
in doubt but an understanding of the real sinews of the Western state which lie, not so
much in a rather threadbare rhetoric of  «mobilisation»,  but  in endlessly painstaking
processes  of  individuation,  homogenisation,  surveillance  and  discipline,  this  perhaps
eluded them. Nkrumah spoke for many when he demanded social change «like jet propul ‐
sion» but the harsh judgement must be that African elites understood as little of the
former as they did of the latter22. 
18 Thus there is little disagreement that the states constructed by African elites are weak,
poorly focused, and their writ rarely runs through the «political kingdom ». The Central
African Republic is doubtless an extreme case in which «the state stops at PK 12» (i.e. twelve
kilometres from the capital)23. But generally speaking Herbst is probably right to assert
that, «no large African country can be said to have consolidated control over its entire territory»24. 
There can surely be little doubt either that,  to a considerable degree, «national» and
«local» politics remain poles apart. Political scientists may ritually protest that they are
«not attempting to resuscitate the tradition versus modern dichotomy», but the substitution of
a focus on the «Cultural  logic of  African poli tics» but not in a narrowly culturalist way, 
suggests that the dreaded dichotomy is not so easily escaped25. Redefined along the lines
suggested here it is hardly surprising indeed that political science constantly uncovers
distinct  «logics»,  suggesting  that  for  example,  «State  law  and  local  normative  orders
constitute different logics» or that «In law, official functioning and budget it [the state] is totally
Western. In practice it is otherwise traversed by logics in drastic contradiction with the original
model»26.
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19 But there is  another side to the story of  that unthinkably bad thing the weak state,
namely, that many African peoples and communities retain a coherence and a capacity
for action that people elsewhere in the world (though notably in the West) have long lost.
Thus the Senegalese Family Code which is (needless to say) in line with «international
standards» but not (of course) African ones, hardly regulates Senegalese families, despite
being the  product  of  years  of  work and passed in  the  teeth of  opposition from the
marabouts,  usually  regarded  as  an  essential  pillar  of  the  Senegalese  state.  This  is
doubtless in part because of the lack of capacity of the Senegalese state to enforce it and
indeed many other laws. But it is also because the laws do not fit local communities and
cultures that still have alternative traditions and therefore other options27. 
20 Similarly in many African countries, land laws, which are often not merely in line with
«international standards» but taken over lock, stock and barrel from the colonial powers
remain unenforced, land registers are not maintained and indeed local officials do not
know what the laws are. None of this suggests particularly efficient or competent states
or, at the least, it suggests proliferations of competing jurisdictions and accompanying
«brokering» of access to such jurisdictions28.  But even today «most land tenure systems are
'communal' in character» and «groups often restrict alienation of land to outsiders, and thus seek
to  maintain  the  identity,  coherence  and  livelihood  security  of  the  group and  its  members»29. 
Generalising this it might be argued that (many) Africans have not yet been disembedded
from land both as a means of security but also of prestige and social and cultural value.
They are practical Marxists and they know that to lose one's means of production is to
become dependent on (unknown) others; better than Marx they know that to lose one's
material means of production is to lose one's cultural means of production.
 
Democracy and Democratisation
21 Colonialism is long gone and cannot be revived30; the modern African state, that is the
elite-driven, modernising-from-above version, is widely agreed to have failed; the urge to
modernise remains. While neither the agencies involved nor their alliances are without
historical precedent the end of the Cold War has allowed a new triumvirate of Western
states, the international organisations they control, and a mot ley alliance of NGOs that
largely do their bidding, to put together a new architecture of interference compounded
of direct interventions, frameworks of conditionalities, and projects to effect long-term
social  change.  The  most  significant  novelty  of  these  arrangements  is  the  lynch-pin
position of international organisations like the World Bank which clearly illustrates many
of the arguments that have been put forward so far. Over some twenty years in which its
actions in Africa have become more and more obtrusive, it is clear that there has been a
twin track attempt both to weaken states (in certain sorts of ways) and to strengthen
them (in other sorts of ways). While this strategy has been shaped by many contingencies,
the international  political  situation and the policy shifts of  Western states and elites
being only the most obvious, the trajectory of the Bank, exemplifies how this project has
expanded and diversified from a narrow focus on economic growth to a concern with
structures of governance, to programmes of social reconstruction which in their scale
and aspirations (if not yet the political will and the resources committed to them) are
paralleled  only  by  nineteenth  century  colonialism  and  the  post-war  occupations  of
Germany  and  Japan.  In  so  doing  the  Bank  has  begun  to  analyse,  comment  on  and
intervene in virtually every facet of the social organisation of African (and some other)
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states.  In  no  sense  can  it  be  plausibly  (any  longer)  described  as  a  bank  or  even  a
development agency.
22 It is within this context that the current processes of democratisation in Africa, at least as
that term is understood by its external promoters, can be located. A recent collection of
studies  suggests  that,  «elite  democracy...  has  been  foisted  upon  reluctant  non-elective
dictatorships  by  economically  dominant  classes  who  have  been  excluded  from  state  power:
professionals and middle classes, international donors and financial institutions»31. There is, as
already  suggested,  a  presentational  dimension  here.  The  old  ideas  of  democracy  as
requiring  preconditions  implies  embarrassing  hierarchies;  the  new  stress  on  the
universality  and  availability  of  democracy  has  a  pleasantly  egalitarian  ring  in  a
supposedly globalising world. But this is a relatively superficial feature (and in any case
the old judgements rapidly return via such notions as the «consolidation» of democracy
and the «quality» of civil society). But the change is more than presentational and forms
part  of  a  strategy  of  civil  society-driven  modernisation32.  The  efforts  to  reform the
African state from above are by no means abandoned but they are thought to need a
complementary  drive  from  below.  Electoral  politics  opens  up  the  possibilities  of
discrediting and removing existing incumbents and putting new kinds of new kinds of
modernising coalitions that will operate within the new frame works designed by the
West. Yet it is widely agreed that such electoral processes require institutionalisation
both  amongst  the  political  elite  and  the  wider  society. At  their  most  ambitious  the
strategies of Western states and their agencies involve the construction of societies of
interests - the «right sort» of civil society will call forth the «right sort» of state. Yet
electoral politics also opens up the possibility that people may make the «wrong» choices;
not  surprisingly,  «Madeleine  Albright,  when  visiting  Kano  recently,  was  taken  aback  when
thanked (albeit ironically) for introducing shari'a: 'but it's due to democracy', she was told»33. 
Thus the democracy on offer must then be carefully hemmed in by external constraints,
covert and overt, and domestically contrived by the «right kind» of local promoters and
allies.  The  historical  continuities  here  are  truly  remarkable.  The  dream  of  «the
advancement of the native populations to a higher state of civilisation» lives on34.
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ABSTRACTS
The author of this article proposes an extremely critical examination of some of the theoretical
assumptions frequently ideological in nature, underlying the scientific and political discussion
around the concepts of «modernisation», «development», and «democratisation». His conclusion
is that African reality can only be adequately understood by means of approaches freed from a
number of current ideas, and that only on this basis will it be possible to define valid strategies.
O  autor  deste  artigo  procede  a  um exame extremamente  crítico  de  alguns  dos  pressupostos
teóricos, frequentemente de natureza ideológica, da discussão científica e política em tomo dos
conceitos da «modernização», do «desenvolvimento» e da «democratização» em África. A sua
conclusão  é  que  a  realidade  africana  só  pode  ser  captada  adequadamente  por  abordagens
desembaraçadas de um conjunto de ideias  feitas,  e  que só nesta  base será possível  conceber
estratégias válidas.
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L'auteur de cet article procède à un examen extrêmement critique de certains sous-entendus
théoriques, fréquemment de nature idéologique, de la discussion scientifique et politiques autour
des concepts de «modernisation», «développement» et «démocratisation». Sa conclusion est que
la réalité africaine ne peut être comprise de façon adéquate qu'au moyen d'approches libérées
d'un ensemble d'idées courantes, et que la définition de stratégies valables n'est possible que sur
cette base-là.
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